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A primary mission for the United States Coast Guard 
(USCG) operating in coastal United States waters is 
to interdict contraband. The USCG schedules a fleet 
of cutters to meet this mission and seeks a way to 
determine the operational efficiency of a particular 
schedule. This paper develops a methodology based 
on generating a sequence of finite horizon dynamic 
programs (DPs), where each DP differs only in the 
way the smuggling vessels and the cutters interac-
t. The DP takes the point of view of the smuggler 
who wishes to develop the smuggling strategy which 
ma..ximizes some characteristic (e.g., the mean) of the 
profit attained. The DP explicitly accounts for a s-
muggler who must combine his short-run profit goals 
with his need to gain future information about the 
configuration of the cutters. We develop a Monte 
Carlo sampling procedure to generate estimates of the 
random variables used in the DP. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The United States Coast Guard (USCG) patrols 
coastal waters under the United States' jurisdiction. 
In recent years, this mission ha<> increasingly called 
on the USCG to interdict contraband in the form of 
illicit drugs and refugees. Accompanied by the De-
partment of Defense, the USCG develops plans for 
locating cutter patrols in an attempt to interdict s-
muggling. Each time period, cutters may move from 
patrol to patrol. 
Cutter schedules are typically not adaptive, sched-
ulers plan cutter use more than a quarter-year in ad-
vance, striving to meet steaming and patrolling goal-
s. Through satisfaction of these goals the USCG at-
tempts to prevent, disrupt, and punish acts of smug-
gling. An optimization model guided by a pat.rolling 
goal for each tuple of (patrol, day, c11ller type) in 
its objective function can produce a sched11lc. The 
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USCG seeks a way to determine the operational effi-
ciency of a particular schedule. 
This paper develops a methodology for doing just 
this. The method involves generating a sequence of 
finite horizon dynamic programs (DPs), where each 
DP differs only in the way the smuggling vessels and 
the cutters interact. The DP takes the point of view 
of the smuggler, and the objective is to develop the 
smuggling strategy which maximizes some character-
istic (e.g., the mean) of the profit attained. In the 
future, we will use a higher fidelity model of cutter ac-
tions, LESIM (1994), to generate seizure data. Our 
goal in the present work is to provide background 
and structure for the integration of the DP with a 
simple stochastic seizure model, with an eye toward 
enhancement in the sequel. 
Figure 1 summarizes the approach taken in this 
paper. The DP formulation captures system charac-
teristics we call Realities below. A state of the DP is 
the relative likelihood that the cutters are configured 
in certain patrols. The action available from any state 
is the single time period smuggling strategy pursued. 
The resulting outcome of a strategy from a state is 
the new likelihood of a cutter configuration. This 
likelihood is computed using the information about, 
seizures, successful smuggling attempts, and a cutter 
fleet motion model. We use a diverse set of possible 
multi-period strategies to populate our DP network, 
where both the single time period profit and the new 
state depend on the random seizure outcomes. 
Upon the successful completion of many iterations 
of each trial strategy for a time horizon (T), we can 
produce empirical distributions for the value of be-
ing in a particular state and taking a particular ac-
tion. We can enforce constraints on the stochastic 
properties of the evolution by removing action/state 
pairs which violate constraints. For example, we can 
eliminate actions which cause half of the total contra-
band shipped to be confiscated with probability 0.3 
or more. Finally, we can test any T-period strate-





















Figure 1: Hybrid Simulation Analytic Model Dia-
gram reflecting the Use of Monte Carlo Samples in 
a Stochastic Dynamic Program 
gy composed of segments of the trial strategies, we 
can chain backward to maximize expected summed 
profit, or we can search for strategies which produce 
desirable quantiles of the value distribution. 
Section 2 discusses literature and motivates our de-
velopment. Section 3 describes modeling the smug-
gler's problem as a DP. Section 4 provides a descrip-
tion of Monte Carlo sampling to build a DP network. 
Section 5 contains conclusions and the Appendix has 
a summary of notation. 
2 APPROACHES 
The pristine smuggler's problem is famous in the liter-
atures of stoc!;iastic analysis, sequential decision mak-
ing and game theory (Owen, 1982). Here arc some re-
cent treatments of the smuggler-interdictor problem: 
2.1 Stationary Shipping 
Many models, including the Law Enforcement Simu-
lation (LESIM, 1994) use a simple filtered Poisson 
process to model the traffic attempted along each 
route. This model assumes that the smuggler ignores 
the presence of the interdictor or any information 
he might gain by succeeding or failing an attempt-
ed shipment. LESIM combines this simple shipping 
model with a high-fidelity model of the act.io1Js taken 
by a cutter during patrol, detection, boarding, and 
seizure. 
2.2 Gaming 
Clearly, smuggling is a game of competing strate-
gics. Examining this approach, Wood and Washburn 
(l 9!J.1) explore game theoretic methods to calculate 
strategies which give both sides maximum expect-
ed equilibrium benefit. Unfortunately for the Coast 
Guard, the opponents are not equally facile in adapt-
ing as the game is played. 
2.3 SOAR 
The Simulation of Adaptive Response (SOAR) mod-
el (Caulkins et al, 1993) models the dynamic fluctua-
tions of shipping prices over time, where the smuggler 
calculates the route with the minimum expected cost 
at each time period. The perception of cost is based 
on shipping expenses and profits, and on perceived 
probability of seizure. The smuggler's memory of a 
captured shipment on a route, r, time units in the 
past fades like e-f3r. The smuggler's actual shipping 
is again a filtered Poisson process, with the splitting 
probabilities proportional to the perceived costs on 
each route. SOAR uses static interdiction probabili-
ties on each route, and allows the user to manipulate 
these to experiment with interdictor schedules. 
2.4 The Realities 
• The USCG schedules cutters on a quarterly or 
yearly basis and docs not deviate from this sched-
ule except in times of crisis. Hence the USCG 
typically does not react to sudden changes in 
traffic by reallocating cutters. 
• The Coast Guard schedules cutters to enter and 
leave patrol areas by designating an area and du-
ration of stay. This duration is generally between 
one and six weeks, and more than one cutter can 
be assigned to an area simultaneously. 
• The smuggler strives to provide a consistent sup-
ply of contraband. For our purposes we assume 
that the smuggler attempts to deliver a constant 
amount of contraband in each time period. 
• The smuggler doesn't know the location of the 
cutters with any certainty, but does get feedback 
in the form of confiscated shipments. Hence the 
smuggler is doing two things at once: 
l. shipping contraband to accumulate imme-
diate profit; 
2. collecting information about the location 
of the cutters so that future decisions are 
made better. 
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3 WHAT THE SMUGGLER KNOWS, AND 
WHAT HE ESTIMATES 
We assume a single smuggler who knows many of the 
cutter scheduling constraints. Here we outline what 
the smuggler knows, and what information he esti-
mates as operations evolve. 
3.1 Smuggler's Knowledge 
We assume that the smuggler has access to the fol-
lowing: 
1. the number of ships in the cutter fleet and the 
locations of the R patrol routes the cutters may 
occupy; 
2. the number of shipments attempted (s(t) = 
(s1(t),s2(t), ... ,sn(t)) and confiscated (n(t) = 
n1(t),n2(t), ... ,nn(t)) at time t; 
3. the ma'<imum and minimum number of cutters 
allowed to patrol the same route; and 
4. the assumed probability that a cutter remains at 
its current station for the next time period. 
3.2 Information Estimated 
At any time, the smuggler estimates the state of the 
cutter fleet expressed as one of the possible config-
urations of the cutters on the R routes. Denote the 
number of cutters on router in configuration c as de,r, 
c = 1, 2, ... , C, where E~=0 de,r equals the cutter fleet 
size and de,. is a specific configuration vector. We use 
route 0 as the location of cutters which are not on 
patrol. 
3.2.1 Cutter Fleet Motion Model 
From the smuggler's point of view, the configuration 
of the cutters on the routes evolves as a discrete time 
Markov chain. Given the perceived prohability of a 
cutter changing patrol route for the next time peri-
od, we can calculate the probability Pe,c' of transition 
from configuration de,. to de',. via complex counting 
arguments. This matrix estimates the likelihood that 
the cutters are in a given sequence of configurations. 
This model is tempered by the outcomes of smuggling 
operations to produce the likelihood that the cutters 
are arranged in a particular configuration in the next 
time period. 
3.2.2 Seizures 
Given the cutter configuration is de,. at time t and 
an assumption that the cutters detect smugglers in-
dependently, the {random) number of seizures Nr(t) 
on route r is distributed as binomial random variable 
P[nr(t)lde,r] = P[Nr(t) = nr(t)ldc.r] = 
( Sr(t) ) (l _ p )d,,,(s,(t)-n,.(t))(l _ {l _ p )d.,,)n,.(t). 
nr(t) r r ' 
(1) 
where Pr is the probability of detection of one smug-
gling vessel by one cutter on route r. 
3.2.3 Likelihood Updates 
In the smuggler's view, the configuration of cutters on 
the routes at time t is a random variable D(t). Let 
<Pe(t) be the smuggler's perceived likelihood that the 
cutter fleet is in configuration c at time t. Based on 
the realized seizures n(t) = (n1(t),n2(t), ... ,nn(t)), 
the prior density ¢(t) = (¢1(t),¢2(t), ... ,¢c(t)), and 
the cutter motion model Pc,c'i the smuggler can calcu-
late the likelihood that de, is the next configuration 
he faces: 





.C[dc1,.ln(t)] = L P[dc,.ldc,.]P[n(t)ld.,,.]P[dc,.](3) 
c=l 
c n 
= L Pc,c'[IT P[nr(t)ldc.-Jl</>c(t); (4) 
c=l r=l 
where .C is the likelihood function. 
The smuggler's goal is to control the flow of con-
traband through the system to meet delivery goals by 
exploiting his estimate</> and by manipulating s(t). 
3.3 Dynamic Programming 
The above updating process lends itself directly to se-
quential optimization for a finite time horizon with T 
as the planning horizon for smuggling operations. Let 
C'1 be the immediate cost of an interdicted shipment, 
including lost equipment, legal fees, and the shipment 
itself. Let C2 be the immediate profit realized from 
a completed delivery. The {random) value of occu-
pying state <P(t) at time t and using future strategy 
s(t), s(t + 1), ... , s(T) can be stated as 
n n 
V(<P(t)ls,t) = - LC1Nr(t) + LC2(sr(t)-Nr(t)) 
r=l r=l 
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+ V(¢(t + l)ls, t + 1) (5) 
where s, t is shorthand for {s(t'), t :5 t' :5 T} and 
t/>(t + 1) is the state resulting from the likelihood up-
date described above in (2). Expected value max-
imization of profit can be accomplished directly by 
choosing s to maximize V(¢(t)ls, t) at each stage: 
E[V(¢(t)lo, t)] = 
fl n 
maxs(t) - L C1E[Nr(t)] + L C2(sr(t) - E[Nr(t)J) 
r=l r=l 
+ E[V(¢(t + l)lo, t + l)] (6) 
where the o signifies the optimal strategy. Using 
1. discretized set of possible likelihood configura-
tions ¢ 1, ¢2 , •.• , ¢L which form a mesh with uni-
form spacing Ll on [O, l]n; 
2. interpolation between the <Ji; 
3. E[Nr(t)] = Sr(t) - sr(t)(l - Pr)dc,• for each t; 
4. E[V(¢1!o,T)]=Oforl=l,2, ... ,L; 
We can solve (6) using backward recursion to pro-
duce an optimal strategy, (s(l),s(2), ... ,s(T)), with 
maximum expected profit. In what follows, we ex-
plore the use of Monte Carlo methods for exploring 
the behavior of (5) when the goal is other than max-
imizing summed expected profit. 
4 MONTE CARLO METHODS 
In order to get a stochastic characterization of the 
possible smuggler operations, we generate a sequence 
of random outcomes of seizures under different smug-
gling strategies. We use these outcomes to populate 
the arc lengths on a network connecting DP states to 
one another. We then exploit methods for examining 
the behavior of networks with stochastic arc lengths 
to characterize the capabilities and tendencies of the 
smuggler. 
4.1 Building the Dynamic Programming 
Network 
Let s 1, s2 , ••• , sf be a set of strategics for trial, s~(l) 
being the number of shipments on route r at time 
period t for strategy i. We will select these strate-
gics so that they reflect methods that will likely be 
successful and so that they represent a diverse set 
of choices~ Let ¢(¢11.'l(t), t + l)k be the k 111 sample of 
the cutter configuration likelihood ef>(t + 1) prod11ccd 
FOR strategy si, i = 1, 2, ... , I 
FOR time period t, t = 1, 2, ... , T 
Configure cutters as de,· 
FOR replication k, k = 1, 2, ... , K 
FOR route r, r = 1,2, ... ,R 
Sample nr(t) from s~(t) 
FOR likelihood ¢1, l = 1, 2, ... , L 
Calculate o(¢1, tls(t))k and 
<fi(</i,t + lls(t))k 
Figure 2: The Monte A Carlo Sampling Procedure to 
Generate Samples of¢ and o, Resulting Likelihoods 
and Immediate Costs, Respectively. 
when we attempt smuggling strategy s(t) from likeli-
hood ¢1 at time period t. What varies between sam-
ples ¢(<1ils(t),t + l)k and ¢(4>1ls(t),t + l)k+l results 
from differences in the number of seizures made. 
Let o(</i ls(t), t)k be the kth sample of the immediate 
value of the strategy s(t) used against likelihood ¢1 
at time t: 
o(¢11s(t),t)k = 
n fl 
- L C1nr(t) + L C2(sr(t) - nr(t)); (7) 
r=l r=l 
nr(t) is the observation of seizures from the kth repli-
cation. 
We develop the set of¢ and o for each time period t, 
likelihood <ti, and each candidate strategy si as shown 
in the algorithm in Figure 2. 
4.2 Measuring Performance and Construct-
ing Strategics 
Thus, we can now produce an empirical distribution 
of the value of pursuing any strategy which is a com-
bination of segments of the s1, s2 , ••• , sf. 
4.2.1 Optimizing Summed Profit 
To collect samples of the optimal summed profit for 
the T time units, we select the strategy s(t)k at each 
stage which optimizes Vi(¢1lo, t) for each ¢1• The 
optimal strategy is found by chaining backward from 
Vk(</i lo, T): 
Vi(¢1ls, t) = 
o(¢1ls(t), t)k + Vi(¢1(¢1is(t),t + l)kls(t),t + 1) (8) 
Where Vk(¢1(</ils(t), t + l)kls(t), t + 1) is calculated 
via interpolation as follows. Let</>(¢) be the adjacent 
likelihoods to ¢: 
c/>(¢) = {</i: I</.>~ -¢rl < Ll,r= 1,2, ... R}. (9) 
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i/>(¢) usually has 2n elements. For each member <Ii E 
i/>(¢), define <Xtf1=11¢1 - ¢112, a.= I:.;e"(.P) <XtfJ· 






As can be shown with computational examples, the 
value of Vk(¢(O)lo, 0) will be much greater than the 
value E[V(¢(O)lo, t)] as calculated in equation (6). 
This is because the maximization is taken after the 
randomness has been realized, rather than before. 
This result mimics many which show how network 
optimization routines used with expected arc lengths 
stray from the results produced when the network 
optimization is done after each arc has realized it 
length. The obvious similarity stems from the link 
between dynamic programming and network short-
est (or longest) paths, see Bailey (19!M) for several 
examples. 
In the smuggler problem, the distinction between 
optimization before or after realization relates the 
distance between the formulation of the smuggling 
policy and the feedback the smuggler receives dur-
ing operations. Before realization, using (6), corre-
sponds to the smuggler planning all of his operations 
strategically - setting his plan before the T time u-
nits begin. Optimization post-realization corresponds 
to the smuggler having a CT'IJStal ball, and knowing 
what seizures he will realize if he follows a particular 
strategy. As reality lies between these two extremes, 
the post-realization answer gives the smuggler an up-
per bound on his performance, while providing the 
USCG with a lower bound on the performance of a 
cutter schedule. 
4.2.2 Maximizing a Quantile 
Using a particular strategy s built from segments of 
s 1, s2 , ••• , s1, the smuggler can produce the empirical 
distribution of the value from the data Vi(</>(O)ls,0) 
directly - Vi(¢(O)ls, 0) is calculated with no expec-
tations taken. From this, the smuggler can compare 
policies on the basis of the a.th quantile of these empir-
ical distributions for different values of s. Techniques 
to sharpen these estimates could be employed, see 
lleidleberger and Lewis (198'1). 
Using a low quantile corresponds to the smuggler 
being risk averse. The smuggler might want to max-
imize his worst-case profit, where worst case is inter-
preted as a profit he is (1- a.)3 sure of receiving. On 
the other hand, he may wish to look for policies which 
have high large quantiles, giving himself the chance 
to make a possible windfall with great risk. 
The search among the possible strategies for those 
which produce a high a.th quantile is clearly problem-
atic. One heuristic would be to ma.ximize the quan-
tile at each stage. Such an approach has the added 
benefit of minimizing the USCG's ability to disrupt 
short-term supply. 
4.2.3 A voiding Disruption of Short-Term 
Supply 
In most real supplier-consumer relationships, the sup-
plier must satisfy target delivery levels and meet 
short-run cash flow constraints during the evolution. 
Also, he seeks to maximize his total profit. Suppose 
that we thinned the table of feasible strategies by 
removing the single time period strategies s(t) from 
likelihood configuration ¢1 at time t such that the 
a.1h quantile of 6(¢1,tis(t))k lies below a prespecified 
value. From the remaining dynamic programming 
network, we could then maximize long-run expect-
ed profit or some quantile of the long-run profit for 
each replication, producing s(t)k for t = 1, 2, ... , T 
and k = 1,2, ... ,K. 
4.2.4 Smuggler Tendencies and Reactions 
Using the table of outcomes and the K x T optimal 
single time period strategies, we can calculate the fol-
lowing quantities directly: 
• the frequency that a single time period strategy 
is optimal; 
• the distribution of the distance (measured in 
some way) between the likelihood configuration 
and the true cutter configuration; 
• the smuggler's cost of reducing T, the planning 
horizon; 
• the distribution of the number of time period-
s the smuggler takes to realize that the cutter 
configuration does not cover a particular route; 
and 
• the distribution of the number of time period-
s the smuggler takes to react to drastically in-
creased coverage of a route. 
5 CONCLUSION 
Some previous attempts at modeling the interaction 
of the smugglers and the USCG patrol schedule give 
too much flexibility to the cutter schedule to be real-
istic. Other approaches don't model the cutter sched-
ule appropriately, so the smuggler's strategies are too 
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simplistic. In this work, we have formulated a dynam-
ic program where the smuggler is forced to combine 
his short-run profit goals with his need to gain future 
information about the configuration of the cutters. 
Using Monte Carlo methods, we have developed a 
scheme to estimate stochastic properties of the smug-
gler's performance using a particular schedule, and 
shown how constraints on the smuggler's short-run 
performance can be enforced. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
The authors would like to acknowledge the help of 
Professor Lyn Whitaker. 
APPENDIX: NOTATION 
• Indices: 
r patrol or smuggler route (r = 0, 1, ... , R), 
c, d cutter configurations ( c = 1, 2, ... , C), 
t,t' time period~ (t = 1,2, ... ,T), 
i strategy (i= 1,2, ... ,/), 
k replication (k = 1, 2, ... , K), 
likelihood (l = 1, 2, ... , L). 
• Data: 
s(t) shipment attempts at time t (s(t) 
( s 1 ( t), s2 ( t), ... , s n ( t)), 
n(t) confiscated shipments in time t (n(t) = 
(n1(t), nz(t), ... , nn(t)), 
dc,r number of cutters on patrol route r in con-
figuration c, 
Pc,<f probability of transition from configuration 
c to d, 
Pr probability of detecting a smuggling vessel 
by a cutter on router, 
C1 smuggler's cost of interdicted shipment, 
C2 smuggler's profit for a completed delivery. 
• Random Variables: 
Nr(t) 
D(t) 
V(ef>(t) Is, t) 
number of seizures using route r at time t, 
configuration of cutters at time t. 
value of pursuing strategy s from time t on-
ward. 
• Other Notation: 
¢>( t) 
¢>i ( t) 
likelihood configuration at time period f., 
i 1h component of </1(t), 
¢(t) 
likelihood operator, 
immediate profit minus immediate costs, 
estimate of ef>(t) generated using likelihood 
updates, 
zth discrete choice of¢>, 
mesh size, 
weight given to ¢>1 for interpolation, 
those </;1 which are adjacent to </J. 
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